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Abstract 
The United States has adopted fuel economy standards that require increases in the on-road efficiency of 
new passenger vehicles, with the goal of reducing petroleum use, as well as (more recently) greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions. Understanding the cost and effectiveness of this policy, alone and in combination 
with economy-wide policies that constrain GHG emissions, is essential to inform coordinated design of 
future climate and energy policy. In this work we use a computable general equilibrium model, the MIT 
Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model, to investigate the effect of combining a fuel 
economy standard with an economy-wide GHG emissions constraint in the United States. First, a fuel 
economy standard is shown to be at least five to fourteen times less cost effective than a price instrument 
(fuel tax) when targeting an identical reduction in cumulative gasoline use. Second, when combined with 
a cap-and-trade (CAT) policy, the fuel economy standard increases the cost of meeting the GHG 
emissions constraint by forcing expensive reductions in passenger vehicle gasoline use, displacing more 
cost-effective abatement opportunities. Third, the impact of adding a fuel economy standard to the CAT 
policy depends on the availability and cost of abatement opportunities in transport—if advanced biofuels 
provide a cost-competitive, low carbon alternative to gasoline, the fuel economy standard does not bind 
and the use of low carbon fuels in passenger vehicles makes a significantly larger contribution to GHG 
emissions abatement relative to the case when biofuels are not available. This analysis underscores the 
potentially large costs of a fuel economy standard relative to alternative policies aimed at reducing 
petroleum use and GHG emissions. It also demonstrates the importance of jointly considering the effects 
of multiple policies aimed at reducing petroleum use and GHG emissions, and the associated economic 
costs. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
How to treat passenger vehicles as part of national climate and energy policy is under 
discussion in many countries. Passenger vehicles (most of them owned by private households) 
are driven around seven trillion miles every year and account for around 20% of manmade 
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions in the U.S., 12% in Europe, and about 5% of emissions 
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worldwide (GMID, 2010; EPA, 2010a; IEA, 2010). As vehicle ownership and use increases in 
many developing countries, identifying effective policy approaches will have not only national, 
but global, import.  
Households in the U.S. in particular are largely dependent  on privately-owned vehicles for 
personal mobility. A U.S. household owns around two vehicles on average and spends around 
10% of its annual income on vehicle transport (U.S. Census Bureau, 2009).
1
 Annual growth in 
the number of private vehicles has averaged about 2.3% per year since 1970, while miles-
traveled per vehicle has trended slowly upward at 0.4% per year (Davis et al., 2009). This trend 
has prompted increasing concern about the externalities associated with passenger vehicles. 
Light-duty vehicles account for 47% of petroleum use in the U.S., and petroleum-based fuels 
supply over 90% of the energy required by vehicles (Davis et al., 2009; Heywood et al., 2009). 
Recent U.S. federal energy legislation has targeted reductions in petroleum use, given concerns 
over the vulnerability of the U.S. to global oil price shocks and its associated national security 
implications (Energy Policy Act of 2005; EISA, 2007). 
This analysis focuses on two policies intended to address the linked goals of reducing 
petroleum use and GHG emissions in the U.S. These policies include an economy-wide cap-and-
trade (CAT) policy and a vehicle fuel economy standard (FES) policy. Although policies are 
often designed separately in the course of the political process, when implemented they will 
interact, affecting energy and environmental outcomes as well as total policy cost. Studies have 
shown that a policy requiring sector- or technology-specific contributions to economy-wide 
abatement can increase the cost of complying with an economy-wide cap on GHG emissions (see 
for example Morris et al., 2010). Here we investigate the consequences of combining policies 
that have the distinct but closely-linked primary goals of mitigating climate change (through a 
cap on GHG emissions) and addressing energy security concerns (through a national fuel 
economy standard that regulates the on-road efficiency of new passenger vehicles). Lessons from 
this analysis are relevant for policymaking efforts in other countries and regions. 
An economy-wide cap-and-trade (CAT) policy for GHG emissions has long been considered 
an economically efficient mechanism for achieving reductions at least cost. The 2009 Waxman-
Markey Act, which included a CAT policy, became the first climate-focused bill to pass the U.S. 
House of Representatives (ACES, 2009). Although never passed into law, a CAT policy may be 
proposed again in future rounds of climate policy discussions. 
Unlike a CAT policy, fuel economy standards have been implemented in the U.S. for a 
several decades. Passed in 1975 to reduce gasoline use in the wake of the 1973 Arab Oil 
Embargo, the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) Standards mandated increases in the 
on-road fuel economy of cars and light-duty trucks starting in 1978 (Shiau et al., 2009). These 
standards were tightened sharply through the early 1980s but remained constant over much of the 
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1990s and were not increased again until 2005 for light trucks and 2011 for cars.
2
 In 2010, 
following classification by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) of GHG emissions as a 
pollutant under the Clean Air Act, the agency became involved in setting per mile emissions 
standards, which were harmonized with a more stringent version of the CAFE standard, which 
mandated an increase in the combined average fuel economy to 35.5 miles per gallon (mpg) in 
2016.
3
 
Multiple policies instruments focused on distinct but related goals are often evaluated in 
separate analyses. However, integrated assessment is essential to understand the potentially large 
impacts caused by policy interaction on the outcomes of interest, as well as the cost. Often 
policies are sold to the public as addressing multiple goals, for instance, both energy security and 
climate change. Policymakers need to understand the cost effectiveness of policies with respect 
to each goal when policies are implemented in combination, since non-linear technology cost 
curves and differences in policy coverage result in an impact that is unlikely to be additive.  
This paper focuses on the impact of a representative fuel economy standard (FES), modeled 
after future U.S. CAFE targets, alone and in combination with an economy-wide cap-and-trade 
system. To evaluate the impact of these policies, a model is needed that captures endogenously 
shifts in vehicle technology and fuels as well as macroeconomic feedbacks and the resulting 
costs associated with policies. The second section describes the details of the model and the 
representation of policies. The third section provides results for the FES implemented alone and 
in combination with a CAT policy. The fourth section concludes with implications for policy.  
2. MODEL DESCRIPTION 
The model used in this analysis is a specialized version of the MIT Emissions Prediction and 
Policy Analysis (EPPA) model that includes a technology-rich representation of the passenger 
vehicle transport sector. The EPPA model is a recursive-dynamic general equilibrium model of 
the world economy developed by the Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change 
at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Paltsev et al., 2005). The EPPA model is built 
using the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) dataset (Hertel, 1997; Dimaranan and 
McDougall, 2002). For use in the EPPA model, the GTAP dataset is aggregated into 16 regions 
and 24 sectors with several advanced technology sectors that are not explicitly represented in the 
GTAP data (Table 1). Additional data for greenhouse gases (carbon dioxide, CO2; methane, 
CH4; nitrous oxide, N2O; hydrofluorocarbons, HFCs; perfluorocarbons, PFCs; and sulphur 
hexafluoride, SF6) are based on U.S. Environmental Protection Agency inventory data and 
projects.  
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 In addition to passenger vehicles, the light-duty vehicle fleet is comprised of cars and light-trucks owned by 
commercial businesses and government. U.S. federal regulations consider a light-duty truck to be any motor 
vehicle having a gross vehicle weight rating (curb weight plus payload) of no more than 8,500 pounds (3,855.5 
kg). Light trucks include minivans, pickup trucks, and sport-utility vehicles (SUVs). 
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2.1 The Passenger Vehicle Transport Sector in the EPPA5-HTRN Model  
To simulate the costs and impacts of policies, models must include both broad sectoral 
coverage and macroeconomic feedbacks as well as an appropriate amount of system detail that 
resolves key variables and the relationships among them as they evolve over time. Few models 
used for policy analysis attempt to address both needs, whether for the case of passenger vehicles 
or for other sectors, and indeed the type of detail required depends on the question being asked. 
The developments undertaken in the EPPA model to enable this work build on previous efforts 
to develop model versions that simultaneously forecast economic and physical system 
characteristics by supplementing economic accounts with physical system data. For instance, 
McFarland et al. (2004) adopt a similar approach as we do here, implementing technological 
detail in a top-down macroeconomic model. Another example is Schafer and Jacoby (2006), 
which examines the response of the transportation sector to economy-wide climate policy by 
coupling a top-down macroeconomic model with bottom-up mode share forecasting and vehicle 
technology models. 
Table 1. Sectors and regions in the EPPA model. 
Sectors Regions 
Non-Energy Developed 
Agriculture USA 
Forestry Canada 
Energy-Intensive Products Japan 
Other Industries Products Europe 
Industrial Transportation Australia & Oceania 
Household Transportation Russia 
Food Eastern Europe 
Services Developing 
Energy India 
Coal China 
Crude Oil Indonesia 
Refined Oil Rest of East Asia 
Natural Gas Mexico 
Electricity Generation Technologies Central & South America 
Fossil Middle East 
Hydro Africa 
Nuclear Rest of Europe and Central Asia 
Solar and Wind Dynamic Asia 
Biomass  
Natural Gas Combined Cycle (NGCC)  
NGCC with CO2 Capture and Storage (CCS)  
Advanced Coal with CCS  
Synthetic Gas from Coal  
Hydrogen from Coal  
Hydrogen from Gas  
Oil from Shale  
Liquid Fuel from Biomass  
Note: Detail on aggregation of sectors from the GTAP sectors and the addition of advanced 
technologies are provided in Paltsev et al. (2005). Details on the disaggregation of industrial 
and household transportation sectors are documented in Paltsev et al. (2004). 
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In this work, several features were incorporated into the EPPA model to explicitly represent 
passenger vehicle transport sector detail. These features include an empirically-based 
parameterization of the relationship between income growth and demand for vehicle-miles 
traveled, a representation of fleet turnover, and opportunities for fuel use and emissions 
abatement. These model developments, which constitute the EPPA5-HTRN version of the 
model, are described in detail in Karplus (2011). The structure of the passenger vehicle transport 
sector in EPPA5-HTRN that includes these developments is shown in Figure 1.  
 The main innovation in the EPPA5-HTRN model is the use of disaggregated empirical 
economic and engineering data to develop additional model structure and introduce detailed 
supplemental physical accounting in the passenger vehicle sector. First, to capture the 
relationship between income growth and VMT demand, econometric estimates were used in the 
calibration of the income elasticities (Hanly et al., 2002), which were implemented using a 
Stone-Geary utility function, a method for allowing income elasticities to vary from unity within 
the Linear Expenditure System (LES) (Markusen, 1993). Second, to represent fleet turnover and 
abatement opportunities in existing technology, global data on the physical characteristics of the 
fleet (number of vehicles, vehicle-miles traveled, and fuel use by both new vehicles (zero to five-
year-old) and used vehicles (older than five years), as well as economic characteristics (the 
levelized cost of vehicle ownership, comprised of capital, fuel, and services components) were 
used to parameterize the passenger vehicle transport sector in the benchmark year and vehicle 
fleet turnover dynamics over time (IRF, 2009; GMID, 2009; Bandivadekar et al., 2008; Karplus, 
2011). Engineering-cost data on vehicle technologies were used to parameterize elasticities that 
determine substitution between vehicle fuel and efficiency capital (EPA, 2010b). Third, 
alternative vehicle and fuel technologies were introduced into the model, using engineering-cost 
data and building on methods developed in previous work (Karplus et al., 2010).  
The representation of technology and its endogenous response to underlying cost conditions is 
particularly essential for analyzing policies, which typically act—directly or indirectly—through 
the relative prices of fuels or vehicles. Here we consider a plug-in hybrid electric vehicle 
(PHEV), which is modeled as a substitute for ICE vehicle technology that runs on both gasoline 
and electricity. The PHEV itself is assumed to be 30% more expensive relative to the internal 
combustion engine (ICE)-only vehicle when it is first adopted. As the levelized price per mile of 
ICE vehicle ownership increases over time (with increasing fuel cost and the introduction of 
efficiency technology), the cost gap is allowed to narrow and may eventually favor adoption of 
the PHEV. When initially adopted, the PHEV faces increasing returns to scale as parameterized 
in earlier work, to capture the intuition that early deployment is more costly per unit until large-
scale production volumes have been reached, which also affects its cost relative to the ICE 
vehicle (Karplus et al., 2010). The PHEV competes against an ICE-only vehicle, which as 
described above is parameterized to become more efficient in response to rising fuel prices. 
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Figure 1. Schematic overview of the passenger vehicle transport sector incorporated into 
the representative consumer’s utility function of the MIT EPPA model. New 
developments are highlighted on the right-hand side of the utility function 
structure.  
2.2 Policy Representation: Fuel Economy Standard and Cap-and-Trade Policy 
 The new model structure allows comparison of energy, environmental, and economic 
outcomes in the baseline scenario. A CAT policy is imposed in the model as a constraint on 
economy-wide GHG emissions as described in previous work (Paltsev et al., 2005). The 
additional disaggregation in the EPPA5-HTRN model makes it possible to impose on-road 
efficiency (fuel economy) targets in the passenger vehicle transport sector.  
 A representative vehicle fuel economy standard was implemented in the model in order to 
simulate a policy constraint similar to the U.S. Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) 
standards. A fuel economy standard is represented in the EPPA model as a constraint on the 
quantity of fuel required to produce a fixed quantity of vehicle-miles traveled. It is implemented 
as an auxiliary constraint that forces the model to simulate adoption of vehicle technologies that 
achieve the target fuel economy level at the least cost.  
 The vehicle fuel consumption constraint equation is shown in Equation 1. All future 
reductions are defined relative to the ratio of fuel, Qf,t0 to miles-traveled, 
QVMT,t0, in the model 
benchmark year (t0). Vehicle fuel economy as described in EPPA is based on the actual quantity 
of energy used and is expressed here as on-road (adjusted) fuel consumption in liters per 100 
kilometers (L/100 km).
4
 Targets set by policymakers are typically reported in the literature and 
popular press using unadjusted fuel consumption (or fuel economy) figures. Unadjusted fuel 
consumption refers to the fuel requirement per unit distance determined in the course of 
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laboratory tests, while adjusted figures reflect actual energy consumption on the road. To obtain 
adjusted fuel consumption, we divide the unadjusted numbers by 0.8, which is an approximation 
of the combined effect on-road adjustment factors applied by the EPA to city and highway test 
cycle estimates (EPA, 2006). The trajectory At  is a fraction that defines allowable per-mile fuel 
consumption relative to its value in the model benchmark year in each future model period. The 
constraint requires that the on-road fuel consumption (FESt) realized in each period remain 
below the target for that year by inducing investment in energy saving technology, which is a 
substitute for fuel. For instance a value of At  = 0.5 in 2030 means that fuel consumption relative 
to the model benchmark year must decline by half. 
FESt ≤ At (Qf,t0 /QVMT,t0)          (1)  
 For purposes of this analysis, we consider two policy trajectories through 2050, with the 
objective of exploring the long-term implications of continuing policies that have been set 
recently for 2012 to 2016, or have been proposed for the period 2017 to 2025. Due to the fact 
that the EPPA model forecasts in five-year time steps, the fuel economy standard was calculated 
to constrain fuel consumption to a level that reflects the stringency of the standard in each of the 
past five years, weighted by imputed new vehicle sales (based on expenditures on vehicle 
capital) in the intervening years. The policy trajectories are shown in Figure 2. We choose two 
representative FES policy pathways. The FES-sharp policy represents a halving of on-road 
adjusted fuel consumption by 2030 and remaining constant thereafter. The FES-gradual policy 
achieves the same cumulative reduction in passenger vehicle fuel use, but does so using steady 
incremental reductions in each compliance period through 2050.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) 
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Year FES 2050 – Gradual FES 2030 – Sharp 
5-year 
average 
% 
below 
2010 
UA 
L/100 
km 
Adj. 
L/100 
km 
Adj. 
mpg 
% 
below 
2010 
UA 
L/100 
km 
Adj. 
L/100 
km 
Adj. 
mpg 
2005-2010   0.0% 9.1 11.4 20.6   0.0% 9.1 11.4 20.6 
2010-2015   9.1% 8.3 10.4 22.7 12.5% 8.0 10.0 23.5 
2015-2020 18.1% 7.5   9.3 25.2 25.0% 6.8   8.6 27.5 
2020-2025 27.2% 6.6   8.3 28.3 37.5% 5.7   7.1 33.0 
2025-2030 36.3% 5.8   7.3 32.3 50.0% 4.6   5.7 41.2 
2030-2035 45.3% 5.0   6.2 37.7 50.0% 4.6   5.7 41.2 
2035-2040 54.4% 4.2   5.2 45.2 50.0% 4.6   5.7 41.2 
2040-2045 63.4% 3.3   4.2 56.3 50.0% 4.6   5.7 41.2 
2045-2050 72.5% 2.5   3.1 74.9 50.0% 4.6   5.7 41.2 
Note: UA – unadjusted (regulatory target), A – adjusted (on-road fuel consumption) 
Figure 2. Adjusted (on-road) fuel consumption trajectories for three alternative FES policies 
shown (a) graphically and (b) numerically. 
 There are several limitations to our approach to representing fuel economy standards. First, 
we model the FES as a single target on all new vehicles sold, rather than a target that must be 
met by each manufacturer. However, we argue that this is realistic because recent CAFE 
standards allow trading of credits across manufacturers, resulting in a sales-weighted average 
target for the new vehicle fleet equivalent to the fuel economy target applied in our model. 
Second, we do not model the potential for oligopolistic behavior among automotive 
manufacturers in their response to the standards. Including this additional component would 
likely make fuel economy standards look even worse on the basis of economic cost, since the 
additional deadweight loss associated with oligopoly rents would need to be included. Third, we 
do not represent the attribute-based component of the standard, which sets target fuel economy 
based on vehicle size. This additional detail is very difficult to model explicitly, given that the 
fleet-wide target fuel economy level will depend on the marginal costs and benefits of shifting 
across weight classes. 
3. RESULTS 
 The policy analysis is divided into several tasks. First, we analyze the FES policy 
implemented alone, and compare it to a tax that achieves the same cumulative reduction.
5
 
Second, we briefly focus on the role of passenger vehicles under a CAT policy using the EPPA5-
HTRN model. Third, we consider the impact of combining the two policies in terms of cost as 
well as gasoline use and GHG emissions reduction outcomes. Fourth, we analyze alternative 
technology scenarios to understand their impact on these outcomes. 
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average tax, and does not apply to any advanced biofuels blended into the fuel supply. 
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3.1 Analysis of a Fuel Economy Standard 
 We begin by assessing the impact of the two FES policies paths described above in Section 2, 
both of which achieve a 20% cumulative reduction in gasoline use. The specific outcomes of 
interest are U.S. motor gasoline use, GHG emissions reductions, and policy cost relative to the 
No Policy reference case. 
 One way to measure the relative cost effectiveness of a fuel economy standard is to compare 
it to another policy instrument. In this case we choose the instrument that theory predicts will be 
economically optimal—a tax on motor gasoline. Two tax cases are considered, one in which 
biofuels are available and another in which they are not. This sensitivity is important because a 
tax that increases the price of motor gasoline thereby reduces the relative price of available 
substitutes, which may play a large role in achieving the overall reduction target.  Indeed, the tax 
required to achieve a 20% cumulative reduction in gasoline use is lower when biofuels are 
available. To allow a consistent basis for comparison, policy costs are discounted at a rate of 4% 
per year and expressed as a net present cost in U.S. 2004 dollars. 
 When comparing the four policy trajectories (two FES policies and two tax policies), clear 
differences emerge in the timing of the reductions, despite the fact that all achieve the same 
cumulative reduction target. Figure 3 shows the reduction trajectories in the a) FES policy and 
b) gasoline tax cases. Several differences are worth noting. Gasoline use decreases in the early 
periods under the gasoline tax (which is implemented as a constant ad valorem tax starting in 
2010) because it bears on the decisions of drivers of all vehicles and thus affects gasoline use by 
new and used vehicles in the first year it is implemented. By contrast an FES policy allows 
gasoline use to continue increasing through 2015 before leveling off and then gradually 
decreasing. The gradual path, which requires the greatest reductions in fuel economy in the later 
years, has to compensate for slower reductions during the early periods. 
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Figure 3. Gasoline reduction trajectories for (a) the fuel economy standard and (b) the 
gasoline tax (with and without biofuels) that achieves a total cumulative reduction 
in gasoline use of 20% relative the reference (No Policy) case. 
 We now compare the cost and GHG emissions reductions associated with achieving the 20% 
gasoline reduction target using each of these policy instruments. Cost is defined here as 
equivalent variation, which is an economic measure of the change in consumption relative to a 
reference (No Policy) case. Costs are calculated using the 4% discount rate, which is also 
assumed in the model structure.  
 The costs and associated GHG emissions reductions under each of the policies are shown in 
Figure 4. The first observation is that for the same cumulative gasoline reduction, the FES 
policies are at least six to fourteen times more expensive than the gasoline tax, with the relative 
cost advantage depending on the availability of advanced biofuels in the tax cases. Comparing 
the two fuel economy standards, the gradual path is much more expensive than the sharp path. 
To understand why, it is important to consider how the policy operates. Its mandate is limited to 
the efficiency of new vehicles, while its impact on gasoline use depends on how much the 
vehicles are driven. In order to achieve significant reductions in gasoline use, the higher 
efficiency vehicles must be driven on the road over multiple years. Thus for a linear path to 
achieve the same reduction in gasoline consumption, the target in the final compliance year must 
be very tight in order to compensate for the effects of the more relaxed standard in earlier 
periods. The marginal cost associated with obtaining additional reductions from advanced 
internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicles and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) to 
produce a five-year new vehicle fleet average fuel consumption of lower than 2.5 L per 100 km 
(unadjusted fuel consumption) increases non-linearly and is very high at these low fuel 
consumption levels. If the electric vehicle (EV) is available at a markup of 60% (and assumed to 
(b) 
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offer an equivalent range and other functionality as an ICE vehicle or PHEV), the cost of 
achieving this tough target is reduced by more than half, demonstrating the importance and 
sensitivity of this result to the cost and availability of advanced vehicle technology and fuels. It 
is also worth noting that in a model with perfect foresight, agents would anticipate high costs in 
future periods and act earlier to reduce fuel economy so that total gasoline use reductions would 
be achieved at lower cost. However, as of this writing, no fuel economy targets have been set 
firmly beyond 2016, and so the myopic logic of the model is consistent with the current limited 
information upon which agents must make decisions about future fuel economy investment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. A comparison of the cumulative change in total fossil CO2 emissions and 
household consumption. 
 The results indicate that for a fixed level of cumulative gasoline reduction (20%), the cost and 
CO2 emissions impact varies. A fuel tax is the lowest cost way of reducing fuel use, with a total 
cumulative discounted cost of $1.7 or $0.7 billion, respectively. The impact on CO2 emissions is 
slightly less under the tax because the tax has the effect of increasing the relative price of 
gasoline used in passenger vehicles relative to fuel used in other non-covered transportation 
modes, and fuel demand (as well as CO2) emissions from these related sectors increases slightly 
relative to the reference case. In the FES-gradual case, the cost is sensitive to the availability of 
EVs (which, if available, result in a reduction in cost from $63 billion to $56 billion).  
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Table 2. Predicted impact of individual policies on travel demand, technology response, and 
economic welfare. 
 
∆VMT in 
2030 
ICE fuel 
consumption 
2030 (L/100 
km) 
ICE fuel 
consumption 
2050 (L/100 
km) 
% PHEV 
in new 
VMT 
2030 
% PHEV 
in new 
VMT 
2050 
Cost 
($ billion / 
year USD 
2004) 
Loss (%) 
relative 
to 
reference 
Reference N.A. 10.2 9.6 1% 14% N.A. N.A. 
Gasoline 
tax 
(biofuels) 
-0.36% 8.9 7.2 19% 46%    1* 0.01%* 
FES-sharp +0.13% 7.2 8.4 14% 45% 10 0.2% 
FES-
gradual 
+0.14% 8.6 4.8 5.5% 40% 63 1.2% 
* No biofuels – Cost is $1.7 billion USD 2004 per year, and loss relative to reference is 0.03%. 
  
 Table 2 summarizes the technology outcomes forecasted by the model under each different 
policy, which helps to explain why the FES policies are significantly more costly relative to the 
tax option. A tax policy incentivizes the pursuit of abatement opportunities according to least 
cost across the entire vehicle-fuel-user system in each model period through 2050. In the initial 
periods, the tax policy incentives reductions in gasoline use through mileage conservation, while 
in the longer term, it incentivizes a mixture of increased ICE vehicle efficiency and PHEV 
adoption. The most striking difference with the FES policy is that the gasoline use by the total 
fleet continues to increase in the early periods, since the policy can only act through changes in 
the composition of the new vehicle sales mix. The FES-gradual policy is particularly costly 
because vehicle efficiency requirements in the later periods must be especially tight to achieve 
the targeted reduction, since vehicles sold in these later years will only make a limited 
contribution on the road to total cumulative gasoline demand.  
 Each of the regulatory policies achieves reductions in GHG emissions relative to the baseline 
case, although these reductions are relatively modest. Cumulative fossil CO2 emissions 
reductions are less than 5% in all cases, with the smallest reductions achieved under the two tax 
policies. Part of the reason why the tax policies result in lower cumulative reductions is due to 
the combination of a large increase in the relative price of petroleum for passenger vehicles 
relative to other sectors. By increasing the retail price of gasoline, the gasoline tax has the effect 
of reducing total petroleum demand, which results in lower relative prices of petroleum in 
sectors excluded from the tax. This larger relative price difference has the offsetting effect of 
increasing demand for fuel as well as associated CO2 emissions in these sectors.  
 An important related question is the impact of excluding from the regulation the GHG 
emissions resulting from the production of electricity for passenger vehicles. If grid emissions do 
not decline, a switch from gasoline to electricity will not translate into commensurate reductions 
in GHG emissions. PHEV adoption as forecasted by the model is shown in Figure 5. Under the 
FES policy, a PHEV is adopted more rapidly and contributes more to offsetting gasoline use than 
under a No Policy scenario. The consequences of PHEV adoption for the electricity sector are 
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shown in Figure 6a. There is a net increase in total electricity production after accounting for an 
increase in electricity use to power PHEVs and a decrease due to reduction in electricity for other 
uses, which occurs as increasing electricity prices incentivize reduction in demand and 
improvements in efficiency. By 2050 PHEV electricity use accounts for around 26% of total 
electric power use (1.75 TkWh), and total electric power use has increased by 3% (from 6.7 to 
6.9 TkWh). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Fraction of new vehicle-miles traveled in PHEVs. FES – Fuel economy standard 
(sharp path). 
 The mix of electricity also changes as a result of shifts in the use of primary energy sources 
(Figure 6b). A decline in motor gasoline consumption leads, through lower petroleum prices, to 
an increase in oil use in electric power generation, as well as slight increases in coal, natural gas, 
and wind power. 
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Figure 6. Energy system trends when PHEVs are available: (a) the evolution of electric 
power generation mix through 2050 and (b) change in primary fuel use due to FES 
policy, relative to the No Policy case. 
 The combined effects of a slightly more GHG intensive power grid under an FES policy and a 
net increase in output due to the addition of electric vehicles result in a net increase in total GHG 
emissions from electric power generation. This increase is offset by a reduction in GHG 
emissions related to gasoline use in passenger vehicles. The net effect on reducing total 
cumulative petroleum use of an FES policy (considering PHEV adoption) is around 11% over 
the period 2010 to 2050, while the effect on GHG emissions is only around 5%. This difference 
is not surprising, given that substituting PHEVs for conventional ICE vehicles directly reduces 
demand for gasoline, but substitutes an energy carrier that at present has a relatively high GHG 
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emissions intensity. In fact, including upstream electricity-related GHG emissions makes PHEVs 
look equivalent or less effective than off-grid hybrids or other more efficient variants of the ICE-
only vehicle in terms of the cost effectiveness of achieving GHG emissions reductions. 
3.2 Impact of the CAT Policy on Passenger Vehicle Transport 
 A cap-and-trade (CAT) policy is a constraint on economy-wide GHG emissions under which 
emissions from regulated sources are capped. Regulated sources then engage in trade that results 
in the allocation of reductions to emitters with the lowest marginal cost of abatement. The CAT 
policy instrument is a longstanding feature of the EPPA model and was adapted for this analysis 
(for more information, see Paltsev et al., 2005; Paltsev et al., 2009). A CAT policy is defined by 
the sources covered, the stringency of the constraint, and a base year relative to which GHG 
emissions reductions are measured.  
 The CAT policy represented in this analysis is based on policies recently proposed in the U.S. 
Congress. The policy considered is defined by a GHG emissions target with gradually increasing 
stringency, reaching a reduction of 44% of GHG emissions in 2030 relative to 2005. The GHG 
emissions reduction targets are consistent with the Waxman-Markey proposal that passed the 
House of Representatives in 2009, which includes a modest amount of international offsets.
6
 The 
policy trajectory is shown in Figure 7. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Target GHG emissions reductions under the CAT system considered in this 
analysis.  
 The unmodified version of the EPPA model gives a projection for primary energy use in the 
U.S. shown in Figure 8 below. Under this representative CAT policy, coal (used primarily in the 
electricity sector) is phased out in favor of nuclear, natural gas, and renewable sources. Most of 
                                                 
6
 International offsets are reductions that are taken from emissions sources not covered by the policies, but once 
certified by an appointed authority reductions can be used to meet some fraction of the GHG emissions reduction 
obligations of covered sources. Offsets thus help to reduce the cost of the CAT policy. 
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the changes in energy use occur in the electricity sector, while petroleum (refined oil) use, 
including use by passenger vehicles, does not decline as significantly. The model also produces a 
GHG emissions price in dollars per ton CO2 equivalent, which rises under the model 
assumptions used in this analysis to around $200 per ton CO2-equivalent by 2050. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Total primary energy use in the U.S. by source under the CAT policy. 
 The impact of the CAT policy on passenger vehicle fuel use, GHG emissions, and PHEV 
adoption in the absence of additional regulation is shown in Table 3 below. 
Table 3. The impact of a CAT policy on passenger vehicle gasoline use, total GHG 
emissions, and the contribution of the PHEV to new VMT in 2050. 
Scenario 
Gasoline - 
passenger 
vehicles 
(billion gal) 
Total GHG 
emissions 
(Mt) 
% PHEVs in 
new VMT, 
2050 
Gasoline - 
passenger 
vehicles 
(% change) 
Total GHG 
emissions 
(% change) 
Reference 6,900 370,000 14% N.A. N.A. 
CAT Policy 3,800 230,000 42% -45% -38% 
  
 It is important to note that the availability of advanced biofuels with negligible GHG 
emissions affects the role that passenger vehicles will play under the GHG emissions constraint. 
If advanced GHG neutral biofuels are available to be used in passenger vehicles, they are 
introduced widely during the period from 2030 to 2050 under a GHG emission constraint. Two 
alternative cases include scenarios in which biofuels are restricted to non-passenger vehicle uses 
of petroleum-based fuel (for instance, only in freight and purchased transport as well as other 
non-transport household applications).  
3.3 Combining a Fuel Economy Standard with a CAT policy 
 An important question for policymakers involves determining the impact of adding a 
regulatory policy that targets reductions in gasoline use to a CAT policy that targets economy-
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wide reductions in GHG emissions. First, we consider the effects on policy cost, gasoline use 
reduction, and economy-wide fossil CO2 emissions reduction. For simplicity and because the 
FES-gradual policy is much more costly, we consider only the sharp reduction path as described 
in Section 2.2 in combination with the CAT policy. In the absence of advanced, carbon-neutral 
biofuels, model results show that combining the FES-sharp with the CAT policy results in 
additional reductions in gasoline use, but also increases the cost of the policy, as indicated by the 
relative size of the circles corresponding to each policy (Figure 9). The total reduction in CO2 
emissions does not change, because that reduction is set by the cap.  
 
Figure 9. A comparison of the cumulative change in gasoline use, total fossil CO2 
emissions, and household consumption from 2005 to 2050 under a FES and CAT 
policy with and without advanced biofuels available. The size of the circle 
corresponds to the magnitude of policy cost. 
It is interesting to compare the implied costs of displacing gasoline and GHG emissions 
(which are joint products) that result from the policy analysis. Assuming that the goal of the 
FES-sharp policy was solely to reduce gasoline use, the discounted cost per gallon of displacing 
gasoline is $0.37. If reducing GHG emissions were the only goal, the implied cost would be $31 
per ton. Under a CAT policy, reducing gasoline use is not the primary target of the policy; 
nevertheless, if reducing gasoline was the only goal, it would be achieved at $2.00 per gallon. 
Under a CAT policy, GHG emissions reductions are achieved at an average cost of $18 per ton. 
When the FES-sharp is added to the CAT policy, additional cost of the gasoline reductions 
beyond those that would occur under the CAT policy alone is $0.68 (per additional gallon 
displaced).  
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 If biofuels are available, significantly greater reductions in passenger vehicle gasoline use are 
cost effective under the CAT policy (orange circle), and the FES-sharp does not change the 
magnitude of the reductions achieved. As long as advanced biofuels with negligible GHG 
emissions are available, they are the preferred abatement option in the later model periods. In 
this optimistic biofuels case, the cost, cumulative fossil CO2 emissions reduction, and cumulative 
gasoline use reduction remain unchanged with the addition of the FES-sharp policy. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
 This paper has provided an analysis of a fuel economy standard (FES) policy, alone and in 
combination with an economy-wide GHG emissions constraint, the cap-and-trade (CAT) policy. 
Results demonstrated that the FES policy is at least six to fourteen times as costly to the 
economy as a gasoline tax that achieves the same cumulative reduction. An FES policy could be 
much more costly if reductions are achieved through a linear path that requires an equivalent 
cumulative reduction, but achieves that reduction through a more gradual path with a stringent 
end goal. The higher cost is due to the fact that in order to contribute to gasoline use reductions, 
efficient vehicles must not just be adopted by consumers, but driven on the road over a period of 
many years. Without a mechanism for spreading the costs over time, the total cost of the policy 
will inevitably be very high. Banking and borrowing provisions could help to offset these costs.
7
 
Nevertheless there are other reasons why even an ―optimally‖ staged FES policy is unlikely to be 
as efficient as a tax. Increasing fuel efficiency reduces the per-mile cost of driving, incentivizing 
an increase in travel that offsets the total reduction, while the tax provides direct incentives for 
reducing gasoline use, both by investing in vehicle fuel efficiency and reducing total mileage.  
 It is important to note that reductions in gasoline use achieved by a fuel economy standard do 
not translate into commensurate reductions in GHG emissions for several reasons. If energy use 
and GHG emissions associated with electric vehicles are not covered under a fuel economy 
standard, both an increase in electricity generation as well as a slight shift to a more carbon-
intensive generation mix lead to an increase in GHG emissions. 
 When combined with a cap-and-trade (CAT) policy, the impact of the fuel economy standard 
depends on whether it binds, which in turn depends on the relative cost and availability of other 
options for abating GHG emissions from passenger vehicles. If advanced biofuels are not 
available, the fuel economy standard binds, raising the cost of complying with the CAT policy 
but achieving reductions in gasoline beyond what would have occurred under the CAT policy 
alone. The implied cost of these additional reductions is an important benchmark for 
policymakers as they consider both national security and climate change priorities. 
 
 
                                                 
7
 As currently written, the 2012 to 2016 CAFE standard includes such provisions. 
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